

**COMPLAINANT**

See appendix

**CONTROLLER**

Klarna Bank AB

**Swedish ref.:**  
IMY-2025-8304

**German ref:**  
521.13799/631.315

**IMI case register:**  
CR134712

**Date:**  
2025-11-26

# Final decision under the General Data Protection Regulation – Klarna Bank AB

## Decision of the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection

The Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection finds that Klarna Bank AB (556737-0431) in its handling of the complainant's request for access made on 5 July 2020 has processed personal data in breach of:

- Article 12(6) GDPR<sup>1</sup> by requesting more data than is necessary to identify the complainant
- Article 12(2) of the GDPR by not facilitating the exercise of the complainant's right.

The Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection issues a reprimand to Klarna Bank AB pursuant to Article 58(2)(b) of the GDPR for the infringements.

## Presentation of the supervisory case

### Background and demarcation

The Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection (IMY) has initiated supervision in case with Swedish reference number IMY-2022-7128 to investigate 28 complaints<sup>2</sup> against Klarna Bank AB (Klarna). Subsequently, IMY has decided that the further investigation of each complaint will take place in separate cases.

IMY's investigation of the complaint in the present case has been limited to the questions whether Klarna has acted in accordance with Article 12(6) of the GDPR when Klarna requested data to identify the complainant and facilitated the complainant's exercise of its right of access in accordance with Article 12(2) of the GDPR. The investigation in the case concerns Klarna's handling of the complainant's request for access made on 5 July 2020. IMY will therefore not take a position on

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<sup>1</sup> Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).

<sup>2</sup> IMY initiated supervision in response to 29 complaints but on 23 September 2023 the complainant withdrew complaint 14 (DI-2021-5908).

whether Klarna's current, general routines for handling requests are compatible with the General Data Protection Regulation.

The complaint in the case has been submitted to IMY, as lead supervisory authority under Article 56 GDPR. The transfer has taken place from the supervisory authority of the country where the complainant has lodged the complaint (Germany) in accordance with the provisions of the Regulation on cooperation in cross-border processing.

The proceedings before IMY were conducted by exchange of letters. IMY has made use of the cooperation and consistency mechanisms provided for in Chapter VII of the GDPR. Relevant supervisory authorities have been the data protection authorities of Austria, Hungary, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Ireland, France, Estonia and Spain.

### **Statement by the complainant**

The complainant states, in essence, as follows. The complainant has on 5 July 2020 requested through mail access to her personal data pursuant to Article 15 of the GDPR.

The complainant has in the context of her request made given Klarna her first- and last name and her postal address.

Klarna has responded to the complainant and requested at least on two occasions the following information in order to handle her request:

- Date of birth
- E-mail address used for a purchase with Klarna
- Klarna invoice number for one of the orders
- Name of a trader the complainant placed an order with
- Exact invoice amount for one of the orders
- Transaction-ID and IBAN if the complainant has used Klarna Open Banking through a third-party provider and access to the personal data stored by it.

Klarna has also requested a telephone number to send a password to the complainant so that she can open a copy of the personal data.

The complainant has objected to provide the requested information and does not consider them necessary to handle her request.

### **Statement by Klarna**

In summary, Klarna has stated the following about the issues covered by the supervision in this case.

Klarna received the complainant's request for access by mail on 13 July 2020 and started the identification process on 14 July 2020 which could not be completed due to the lack of additional information from the complainant. The complainant has stated that she will not provide additional information and Klarna has informed the complainant that identification is a requirement for sending a copy of her personal data. A discussion on the identification process has continued and Klarna has informed the complainant that the information she has provided is not sufficient to

identify her. As the complainant has not provided the requested information, the identification process could not be completed.

In the context of meetings between Klarna and the supervisory authority in Berlin from June to August 2021, a copy of the complainant's personal data was sent to the complainant by post on 13 August 2021.

#### **Has Klarna had reason to doubt the identity of the complainant?**

Klarna has stated that in June 2017 the company was granted a banking license by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. This means, among other things, that the company is obliged to maintain banking secrecy in accordance with Chapter 1, Section 10 of the Banking and Financing Business Act (2004:297) and that Klarna must therefore not unlawfully disclose individuals' relationship with Klarna as a credit institution. In addition, Klarna processes information that many customers perceive as sensitive, such as credit decisions, payment history and information according to the anti-money laundering regulations. Klarna therefore needs to ensure that information is not disclosed to unauthorised persons and that the identity of customers is not revealed. Therefore, in addition to the provisions of data protection law, the requirement of banking secrecy must also be taken into account when identifying data subjects in the context of access or erasure requests. Furthermore, it should be noted that financial institutions, such as, inter alia, banks, are particularly vulnerable to fraud attempts of various kinds. One example is attempts to obtain personal data from third parties that enable identity theft. Providing personal data to an unauthorized third party would not only enable fraud at the expense of the data subject and Klarna, but potentially also on the data subjects of online merchants who have used one of Klarna's payment methods. Consequently, Klarna must ensure that no personal data is exposed to unauthorized persons and, in case of doubt, ask for additional data points for identification.

Klarna continuously develops its identity verification processes to ensure that unauthorized persons cannot access customers' personal data.

At the time of the request, Klarna had reason to doubt the identity of the complainant, since the complainant only provided her name, i.e. one of the necessary data points to be considered identified according to the current routine. For this reason, Klarna has not been able to fulfil the request.

#### **What information has Klarna required to handle the request?**

Klarna states that the complainant was asked to provide the following information:

- Name
- Date of birth
- E-mail address
- Invoice number
- Name of a merchant the complainant placed an order with.

Klarna has also requested a telephone number to send a password to the complainant in order for her to be able to open a copy of the personal data.

#### **Why was the information necessary to confirm the identity of the complainant?**

Klarna's identification routine has always been based on the premise that a customer's identity can be verified by the customer providing a number of different data points that only the customer should know about, and to prevent unauthorised persons from

guessing the information required for identification. In order to simplify for customers, Klarna states within the identification process the points that in different combinations can be used to verify a customer's identity. Since customers can remember different data and have used payment methods that require different data, Klarna has provided the complete list of data points. However, not all information from the list is needed in each individual case. Instead, different combinations of these points have been sufficient to identify the customer, depending on when in time and in which country the request was made. In cases where a customer service employee requested additional data points even though a customer had already submitted enough information to be identified, the cases have been handled incorrectly.

In the present complaint, according to the identification procedure then in force for Germany, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, Klarna has not been able to carry out a secure identification of the complainant and has therefore requested additional information to ensure that the complainant's personal data does not fall into the wrong hands. In doing so, Klarna has indicated all the additional data points that count as possible data points, but different combinations of those data points have been possible for the secure identification of the complainant.

#### **What information was collected when the customer relationship was established and what is new?**

Klarna has not been able to identify data about the complainant's first purchase. However, for identification purposes, Klarna only collects data corresponding to the data already collected.

## **Motivation of the decision**

### **Applicable provisions, etc.**

Pursuant to Article 12(2) of the GDPR, the controller shall facilitate the exercise of the data subject's rights in accordance with Articles 15 to 22.

Article 12(6) of the GDPR states that, without prejudice to Article 11 of the GDPR, where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject.

The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) Guidelines 01/2022 on the right of access<sup>3</sup> state the following.

In cases where the controller requests or is provided by the data subject with additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject, the controller shall, each time, assess what information will allow it to confirm the data subject's identity and possibly ask additional questions to the requesting person or request the data subject to present some additional identification elements, if it is proportionate.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> European Data Protection Board (EDPB) Guidelines on the right of access – Guidelines 01/2022 on data subject rights – Right of access, version 2.0 (finally adopted on 28 March 2023) (EDPB Guidelines 01/2022).

<sup>4</sup> EDPB Guidelines 01/2022, paragraph 67

As indicated above, if the controller has reasonable grounds for doubting the identity of the requesting person, it may request additional information to confirm the data subject's identity. However, the controller must at the same time ensure that it does not collect more personal data than is necessary to enable authentication of the requesting person. Therefore, the controller shall carry out a proportionality assessment, which must take into account the type of personal data being processed (e.g. special categories of data or not), the nature of the request, the context within which the request is being made, as well as any damage that could result from improper disclosure. When assessing proportionality, it should be remembered to avoid excessive data collection while ensuring an adequate level of processing security.<sup>5</sup>

The controller should implement an authentication procedure in order to be certain of the identity of the persons requesting access to their data, and ensure security of the processing throughout the process of handling an access request in accordance with Art. 32 GDPR, including for instance a secure channel for the data subjects to provide additional information. The method used for authentication should be relevant, appropriate, proportionate and respect the data minimization principle. If the controller imposes measures aimed at authenticating the data subject which are burdensome, it needs to adequately justify this and ensure compliance with all fundamental principles, including data minimization and the obligation to facilitate the exercise of data subjects' rights (Art. 12(2) GDPR).<sup>6</sup>

## The assessment by IMY

### **Has Klarna acted in accordance with Article 12(6) of the GDPR when Klarna requested additional data from the complainant?**

#### *Has Klarna had reasonable grounds to doubt the identity of the complainant?*

It is only where the controller has reasonable doubts as to the identity of the requester that additional information to confirm the identity may be requested. What constitutes 'reasonable grounds' in Article 12(6) of the GDPR should be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the individual case. The assessment of whether there are reasonable grounds to doubt the identity of the requester in an individual case is normally made in the light of the information provided in the context of the request. This is particularly true in situations where the controller does not have detailed knowledge of that person. However, the need for an individual assessment does not preclude the establishment of procedures by which the controller normally verifies the identity of the data subject.

The requirements that can be placed on the information should typically be higher the more sensitive the processing of the personal data is. In other words, one type of information for identification may be sufficient for identification in the case of one processing operation but may cast doubt in the case of another.

As supporting documents in the matter may be understood, the complainant provided her first and last name and her postal address when she made her request for access to Klarna. Klarna has stated that the complainant only provided her name and that Klarna had reasonable doubts as to the identity of the complainant, since the complainant only provided one of several necessary data points in order to be

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<sup>5</sup> EDPB Guidelines 01/2022, paragraph 70.

<sup>6</sup> EDPB Guidelines 01/2022, paragraph 71.

considered, according to the routine at the time, to be identified. Klarna also states that the requirement of banking secrecy, which it is required to maintain, must be taken into account when identifying data subjects in connection with requests for access or erasure. In addition, Klarna processes information that many customers perceive as sensitive and the company thus needs to ensure that information is not disclosed to unauthorized persons and that customers' identity is not revealed. Financial institutions are particularly vulnerable to fraud attempts of various kinds and Klarna must ensure that no personal data is exposed to unauthorized persons and, in case of doubt, ask for additional data points for identification.

IMY notes that the purpose of the obligation to ensure the identity of the person making the request is, inter alia, to protect data subjects against the erroneous making of requests in their name by someone else, which may lead to negative consequences for data subjects. In the light of Klarna's submissions, in particular as regards the nature of the personal data processed by Klarna, and in the light of the information provided by the complainant in its request for access, IMY considers that there is no reason to doubt that Klarna had reasonable grounds to doubt the complainant's identity at the time of the request was made. This applies regardless that the complainant provided both her first and last name and her postal address.

*Has the information requested by Klarna been necessary to confirm the identity of the complainant?*

The General Data Protection Regulation does not explicitly regulate which data may be requested or how the additional information is to be collected. However, the principle of data minimisation laid down in Article 5(1)(c) of the GDPR is central in this regard. Even if the controller has reasonable doubts about the identity of the data subject, the controller shall not collect more personal data than is necessary to enable the identification of the data subject. To routinely require data for identification without regard to whether the data are necessary in the manner described in Article 12(6) of the GDPR is contrary to that provision. The controller must carry out a proportionality assessment and be able to justify the verification method used. The proportionality assessment must be carried out in order to determine what is appropriate in the light of the Regulation's requirements relating, inter alia, to security, but also in the light of the requirement laid down in Article 12(2) of the GDPR, according to which the controller is to facilitate the exercise of the data subject's rights. In order to avoid excessive data collection, a request for additional information must be proportionate to the type of data being processed and the harm that may result from the disclosure of data to the wrong person.

In summary, Klarna has stated that data subjects can identify themselves through different combinations of a number of data points established in Klarna's routine. In the identification process, all of these possible data points are requested, but not all of them are necessary for the identification of the data subject. Klarna states that, in the complaint at issue Klarna asked the complainant to provide five additional data points in order to identify her.

It follows, inter alia, from the EDPB Guidelines on the right of access that, in the proportionality assessment, the controller must take into account the type of personal data processed (e.g. special categories of data or not), the nature of the request, the

context in which the request is made and any damage that may result from undue disclosure.<sup>7</sup>

As regards the information requested by Klarna from the complainant, IMY notes the following. In view of the fact that Klarna carries out banking activities, the disclosure of personal data to an unauthorised person could have serious consequences for the complainant. The identification requirements must therefore be set relatively high.

However, according to Klarna itself, not all of the additional information requested was necessary to identify the complainant. As mentioned above, the controller shall carry out a case-by-case assessment and shall not request more personal data than necessary to identify the requesting data subject. It does not appear that Klarna made such an assessment in the complainant's case. To routinely require a large number of data for identification in the manner that has taken place without regard to whether the data are necessary in the manner described in Article 12(6) of the GDPR and moreover to repeat the request even though the data in question already has been provided is contrary to the provision in question.

In view of the fact that more data than was necessary to identify the complainant has been requested, IMY considers that Klarna has processed the complainant's personal data in breach of Article 12(6) of the GDPR.

### **Has Klarna pursuant to Article 12(2) of the GDPR facilitated the exercise of the complainant's right of access?**

Pursuant to Article 12(2) of the GDPR, the controller shall facilitate the exercise of the data subject's rights in accordance with Articles 15 to 22.

Klarna has requested the complainant to provide information on, inter alia, the invoice number, the name of a trader at which the complainant had previously made a purchase and the exact amount of the invoice. As can be seen above, IMY considered that not all the information requested by Klarna was necessary to identify the complainant. As a result, the complainant needs to carry out research in order to find several items of information relating, inter alia, to previous purchases, even though such information was not always necessary. In addition, Klarna has requested the complainant to provide the information again although the complainant already provided it. Against this background, IMY considers that the verification method was too burdensome for the complainant in such a way that it complicated the exercise of the right of access.

IMY therefore concludes that Klarna has not facilitated the exercise of the data subject's right in the manner required by Article 12(2) of the GDPR. Klarna has thus processed the complainant's personal data in breach of Article 12(2) of the GDPR.

### **Choice of corrective measure**

In case of deficiencies, IMY may take certain corrective actions. It follows from Article 58(2) and Article 83(2) of the GDPR that the IMY has the power to impose administrative fines in accordance with Article 83. In the case of a minor infringement, as set out in recital 148, instead of imposing a fine, IMY may issue a reprimand pursuant to Article 58(2)(b). Account shall be taken of aggravating and mitigating

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<sup>7</sup> EDPB Guidelines 01/2022, paragraph 70.

circumstances of the case, such as the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement and relevant previous infringements.

IMY notes the following relevant facts. IMY has found that Klarna has requested more information than is necessary to identify the complainant. However, the data requested by Klarna did not consist of sensitive, particularly protective or otherwise privacy-sensitive data. IMY also found that Klarna had not facilitated the exercise of the complainant's right of access. However, Klarna responded without delay to the complainant's letters in order to comply with her request for access. Although the complainant's right of access was only granted in August 2021, the deficiencies found are of a less serious nature than if the request had been left unanswered.

In the light of the foregoing, IMY takes the view that these are minor infringements within the meaning of recital 148 that require Klarna to be given a reprimand under Article 58(2)(b) of the GDPR for the infringements found.

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This final decision has been taken by [REDACTED], Department Lawyer, following a presentation by [REDACTED], Legal Advisor.

### **Appendix**

The complainant's personal data

### **Copy to**

Data Protection Officer

## **How to appeal**

If you wish to appeal the decision, you should write to IMY. Indicate in your letter the decision you wish to appeal and the amendment you are requesting. The appeal must be received by IMY within three weeks of the date on which you received the decision. However, if you are a party representing the public, the appeal must be received within three weeks of the date of notification of the decision. If the appeal has been received in due time, IMY will forward it to the Administrative Court in Stockholm for consideration.

You can e-mail the appeal to IMY if it does not contain any privacy-sensitive personal data or information that may be covered by confidentiality. The contact details of the authority can be found on the first page of the decision.